Syria Weekly: Data

Syria Data Update: July 29, 2026

Charles Lister — Wed, 29 Jul 2026 12:01:43 GMT

^{COVER IMAGE CREDIT: OMAR ALBAW/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images}

The overall level of deadly violence remained largely steady last week, with 17 confirmed fatalities across the country — 6 (35%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). The remaining 11 non-UXO deaths makes last week just below the average of 12.5 non-UXO deaths witnessed through June and July, but still above the average of 8.6 non-UXO deaths since March.

As noted last week, a rise in domestic tensions around issues of transitional justice and accountability for crimes, and a resulting increase in vigilantism and targeted killings has been the primary driver behind the uptick in violence seen so far this Summer. Even so, the level of non-UXO deadly violence in Syria in 2026 is dramatically lower than in 2025 — with a weekly average of 19 deaths recorded in 2026 and an average of 73 in 2025.

This past week, three especially noteworthy datapoints and observations are worth highlighting:

Syria Data Update: July 22, 2026

Charles Lister — Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:31:51 GMT

The overall level of deadly violence remained largely steady last week, with 17 confirmed fatalities across the country — 5 (29%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). The 12 remaining non-UXO deaths makes last week just below the average of 13.3 non-UXO deaths witnessed through June and July, but still above the average of 8.5 non-UXO deaths since March.

A rise in domestic tensions around issues of transitional justice and accountability for crimes, and a resulting increase in vigilantism and targeted killings has been the primary driver behind the uptick in violence seen so far this Summer. Even so, the level of non-UXO deadly violence in Syria in 2026 is dramatically lower than in 2025 — with a weekly average of 19 deaths recorded in 2026 and an average of 73 in 2025.

With regards to this past week, two particularly significant data-specific observations are worth highlighting:

Syria Data Update: July 15, 2026

Charles Lister — Wed, 15 Jul 2026 14:12:35 GMT

The overall level of violence declined over the past week, with a total of 15 violent deaths recorded, 4 (27%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance. The 11 non-UXO deaths confirmed over the 7-day reporting period represents a near halving of the rate seen the previous week and a return to close to the average low of 9 non-UXO deaths per week seen since February 1.

This appears to underline the reality that without unusual mass casualty terror attacks — such as the July 2 bombing of a cafe near Damascus’ Justice Palace that left 10 dead — Syria’s path of stabilization is at the least stable.

Several key areas of insight can be gleaned from this week’s latest data update:

Syria Data Update: July 8, 2026

Charles Lister — Wed, 08 Jul 2026 12:03:07 GMT

The overall level of violence last week reached the highest level since mid-February, with a total of 26 deaths confirmed nationwide — 7 (27%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO).

More than 50% of the 19 non-UXO deaths in Syria over the past week were caused by one single incident — an IED detonated inside a cafe near the Justice Palace in Damascus on July 2, which killed 10 people. That attack, which has yet to be claimed by any perpetrator, was highly significant and a warning of the threats still posed by the likes of ISIS or militant cells tied to Hezbollah and the anti-government insurgency. Without that one incident, Syria’s level of violence would have remained in line with the record lows witnessed over the past 3 months.

Several key areas of insight can be gleaned from this week’s latest data update:

Syria Data Update: July 1, 2026

Charles Lister — Wed, 01 Jul 2026 13:02:47 GMT

The overall level of violence in Syria declined over the past 2 weeks, with a total of 27 deaths confirmed over 14 days (June 16-30), 4 (15%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). That put Syria back onto the average level of overall violence (~13 deaths per week) seen between February and the end of May 2026 — before violence increased slightly through the first half of June, with an average of 19 deaths per week.

Several notable developments or trends emerged over the past fortnight, as follows:

Syria Data Update (June 9-16, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 17 Jun 2026 11:19:43 GMT

The overall level of deadly violence across Syria declined slightly compared to the previous week’s high, with a total of 18 deaths confirmed across the country — 5 (28%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). The fact that violence has remained at higher levels over the past two weeks compared with the previous 3 months, is attributable to one key escalating challenge:

Transitional justice was always going to be a defining challenge for Syria’s post-Assad transition, as the country grapples not just with nearly 14 years of civil conflict (2011-2024) but the costs and grievances resulting from more than half a century of Assad rule as well as from sectarian and internecine killings that followed the regime’s fall. At the crux of the challenge is where to draw the line between justice and reconciliation. While the transitional government has unquestionably cracked down upon ‘remnants’ of the former regime, it has also negotiated deals with some prominent individuals and attempted to provide the space for more low ranking people to move past history and reintegrate.

That latter, pragmatic approach has engendered increasing tensions across the country, as locals identify individuals they accuse of any number of crimes during the 2011-2024 conflict. Early in the transition, this triggered acute levels of vigilante violence and targeted revenge killings, but from October/November 2025, this declined sharply.

However, in recent weeks, the transitional justice issue has surged back onto the public agenda, principally within components of communities across Syria decrying the presence of regime remnants still living in their midst. Throughout Syria, communities have increasingly demanded that such ‘remnants’ be detained, their families be expelled from their homes and their businesses seized. While targeted vigilante killings have subsequently increased — with 18 deaths recorded over the past two weeks — incidents of localized protest, rioting and mob violence (public beatings, vandalism and arson) have surged.

The government’s initial response to this sudden explosion in localized retributive violence has been to reveal the scale and scope of its actions against regime remnants, with the MOI confirming the detention of 5,989 senior officers over the past 18 months. The Justice Ministry, the Commission for Transitional Justice and other official entities have all issued public statements detailing their respective work to pursue transitional justice and calling on citizens to avoid taking the law into their own hands. Whether this increase in public openness will suffice in calming tensions across the country remains to be seen, but there is no doubt that efforts over the past 18 months have been insufficient on all counts and the longer instability and revenge violence continues, the more likely it is to trigger secondary violence — whether a resurgence of the anti-government insurgency, or opportunities for actors like ISIS to exploit.

Beyond vigilantism, which accounted for 9 of 13 (70%) non-UXO deaths this past week, the remaining fatalities were attributable to:

Suwayda inter-factional violence between rival Druze militiamen left 2 gunmen dead.
An ISIS suicide attack on an MOI building in Raqqa city left 1 officer dead.
Clashes between rival families in Daraa’s al-Maliha al-Sharqiya left one combatant dead.

Also of note is that ISIS appears to be attempting to increase its operational tempo — having conducted 4 attacks over the past week:

Two ISIS gunmen on a motorbike opened fire at an Iraqi oil tanker driving on the Aleppo-Manbij highway late on June 13. It caused minor damage and no casualties.
Two suspected ISIS militants on a motorbike opened fire on a truck carrying salt in the desert outside Palmyra on June 14. It caused light damage and no casualties.
One MOI officer was killed and 3 others were injured when 2 ISIS militants stormed a local MOI security headquarters in Raqqa on June 15, prompting an armed clash during which one of the ISIS militants detonated his explosive vest.
A local judicial official in Babila, Damascus was severely injured when an IED concealed inside his vehicle was detonated by ISIS on June 16.

These attacks stand out for their having targeting of locally or strategically significant targets. In particular, attacks on trucks traversing Syria, if sustained, risks impacting confidence in Syria as a corridor for land transit — a recent new source of revenue that Syria has gained via Iraqi trade, both in oil and other commercial goods.

Syria Data Update (June 2-9, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:03:42 GMT

The overall level of violence across Syria last week rose to its highest level in 10 weeks, with a total of 19 violent deaths recorded — 4 (21%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). This abrupt increase in violence was attributed to several key developments:

Syria Data Update (May 26-June 2, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 03 Jun 2026 11:21:40 GMT

The overall level of violence in Syria rose over the past week, to a level last seen in mid-April. Over the 7-day period, a total of 16 deaths were confirmed, 7 (44%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). The…

Syria Data Update (May 19-26, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 27 May 2026 13:49:32 GMT

Syria Data Update (May 12-19, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 20 May 2026 13:30:03 GMT

Dear subscribers — I’m excited to introduce 4 new datasets to the regular weekly data updates. This makes for a total of 11 exclusive and comprehensive datasets available for all paid subscribers:

NEW: Government Captagon Seizures
NEW: Internal Suwayda [In-]Stability (incidents, casualties)
NEW: Jordanian Military Action - Drug Interceptions & Airstrikes
NEW: Lebanon-linked Captagon Seizures in Syria
Violent deaths in Syria (by governorate & overall)
Israeli military actions in Syria (ground incursions, air/artillery strikes, arrests)
ISIS attacks (2023-present)
Anti-government insurgency (by governorate & overall)
Vigilantism
Unexploded ordnance; UXO (by governorate & overall)
Kidnappings (by governorate & overall)

Syria just achieved its most stable week in 15 years, with a total of 6 violent deaths confirmed nationwide, 3 (50%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). Until this past week, the previous record low for overall violence had been set the previous week (May 5-12, 2026), when a total of 9 deaths were recorded across Syria.

As noted previously, the incidence of direct (i.e. non-UXO) violence in Syria has also been on a sustained record low since early-March 2026, with all records from the past 15 years recorded in the last 10 weeks:

2 deaths (March 24-31)
3 deaths (April 14-21, May 12-19)
5 deaths (April 21-28)
6 deaths (March 3-10, April 7-14)
7 deaths (March 10-17, March 31-April 7 and May 7-12)
8 deaths (March 17-24)

Looking more closely at all the datasets and security developments in Syria from the past week, three areas of significant analytical insight are worth highlighting:

Syria Data Update (May 5-12, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 13 May 2026 15:31:58 GMT

The overall level of violence in Syria hit an all-time record low this past week, with 9 deaths recorded — 2 of which (22%) were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). Until now, the previous overall low was 10 deaths, which Syria Weekly recorded in the week of March 10-17, 2026.

As noted previously, the incidence of direct (i.e. non-UXO) violence in Syria has also been on a sustained record low since early-March 2026, with all record lows from the past 15 years recorded in the last 10 weeks:

2 deaths (March 24-31)
3 deaths (April 14-21)
5 deaths (April 21-28)
6 deaths (March 3-10, April 7-14)
7 deaths (March 10-17, March 31-April 7 and May 7-12)
8 deaths (March 17-24)

For the past 2 weeks, several areas of analytical insight are worth highlighting when it comes to conflict and security data:

Syria Data Update (April 28-May 5, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 06 May 2026 14:51:24 GMT

Dear subscribers,

Please note that we’ve added a new dataset this week, covering all seizures of Captagon across Syria since January 1, 2025. As far as all publicly recorded incidents are concerned, a total of 188,959,550 Captagon pills have been seized since then.

As with all other datasets, this one will now be updated every week.

The overall level of violence in Syria over the past 7 days remained in line with the record lows of recent weeks, with a total of 13 deaths confirmed in violent incidents across the country. However, a notable and negative shift occurred that is worthy of caution.

Syria Data Update (April 14-28, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 29 Apr 2026 13:53:23 GMT

A total of 23 people were killed across Syria over the past 2 weeks — making this the second least violent fortnight in 15 years. Of the 23 deaths, 15 (or 65%) were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and the remaining 8 (39%) were the result of direct acts of violence.

As noted previously, the incidence of direct (i.e. non-UXO) violence in Syria has been on a sustained record low since early-March 2026, with all record lows from the past 15 years recorded in the last 8 weeks:

2 deaths (March 24-31)
3 deaths (April 14-21)
5 deaths (April 21-28)
6 deaths (March 3-10, April 7-14)
7 deaths (March 31-April 7 and March 10-17)
8 deaths (March 17-24)

For the past 2 weeks, several areas of analytical insight are worth highlighting:

Syria Data Update (April 7-14, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 15 Apr 2026 12:06:03 GMT

A total of 16 violent deaths were recorded across Syria over the past week — 10 (63%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). The remaining 6 deaths were caused by direct acts of kinetic violence, making this week on par with the 2nd least violent week in Syria in 15 years, with all record lows recorded in the past 6 weeks:

2 deaths (March 24-31)
6 deaths (March 3-10, April 7-14)
7 deaths (March 31-April 7 and March 10-17)
8 deaths (March 17-24)

As was the case with last week’s data, this week further underlines two consistent trends emerging from Syria Weekly data in 2026, that while the overall level of deadly violence in Syria has declined significantly since mid-to-late 2025:

(1) Direct or kinetic violence has significantly declined since late-January 2026.

(2) UXO incidence and casualties have markedly increased in 2026.

For this week, several areas of analytical insight are worth drawing out:

Syria Data Update (March 31-April 7, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 08 Apr 2026 16:31:34 GMT

A total of 22 violent deaths were recorded across Syria over the past week — 15 caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO), making this the biggest weekly UXO toll seen in Syria since mid-May 2025. The remaining 7 deaths caused by direct kinetic violence marked the third lowest weekly toll in Syria on record, with all record lows having occurred over the past 5 weeks:

2 deaths (March 24-31)
6 deaths (March 3-10)
7 deaths (March 31-April 7 and March 10-17)
8 deaths (March 17-24)

This past week serves to underline two consistent trends emerging from Syria Weekly data in 2026 — that while the overall level of deadly violence in Syria has declined significantly since mid-to-late 2025, (1) direct or kinetic violence has significantly declined since late-January 2026 and (2) UXO incidence and casualties have markedly increased in 2026.

For this week, several areas of analytical insight are worth drawing out:

Syria Data Update (March 24-31, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 01 Apr 2026 19:26:18 GMT

Last week saw the lowest level of violence in Syria in 15 years, while the month of March closed out as the least violent month in Syria in 15 years. As Syria Weekly data has been documenting since August 2025, the level of violence across Syria has been on a downward trend for some time. In fact, deadly violence in Syria declined by 30% between January and August 2025, and then plummeted by 73% in the final third of the year. Notwithstanding a brief period of fighting in Syria’s northeast in January 2026, the months of February and March 2026 have set consecutive record lows in violence, with March seeing a total of 23 people killed in direct acts of violence. That is 60% lower than the February 2026 record low of 58 deaths and 94% lower than the post-Assad average of 356 deaths per month.

Specifically, last week saw a total of:

Syria Data Update (March 17-24, 2026)

Charles Lister — Tue, 24 Mar 2026 15:30:41 GMT

The overall level of deadly violence over the past week in Syria was the second lowest ever on record, with a total of 12 deaths recorded across the country — 4 (33%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). The 8 non-UXO deaths confirmed across Syria represented the third lowest level ever on record, after the 7 and 6 deaths recorded in the previous two weeks, respectively.

Consequently, March is currently on track to be the least violent month in Syria in the past 15 years.

Of the 12 deaths confirmed across Syria last week, four causes were at play:

Syria Data Update (March 10-17, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 15:31:04 GMT

The overall level of violent deaths across Syria rose last week, with a total of 19 confirmed — compared to the record low of 11 deaths recorded the week prior. This week’s casualty level however, remains considerably below the average noted by Syria Weekly since October 2025, when Syria’s overall level of weekly violence has been on a gradual declining trend.

Most significant and importantly though is the fact that this week’s overall increase in violent deaths was entirely due to:

Syria Data Update (March 3-10, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 12:31:38 GMT

While conflict raged across the Middle East, Syria recorded its lowest level of violence on record over the past week, with a total of 11 deaths confirmed — 5 (45%) of which were caused by unexploded ordnance (UXO). The remaining 6 violent deaths across Syria last week were attributed to:

Syria Data Update (Feb 24-March 3, 2026)

Charles Lister — Wed, 04 Mar 2026 17:01:20 GMT

The overall level of violence across Syria declined back to near-record levels this past week, with a total of 20 violent deaths confirmed — 9 (45%) of which were the result of unexploded ordnance (UXO). This week’s decline in violence followed a brief spike recorded the week prior, when a total of 35 violent deaths were confirmed, 8 (23%) of which were attributed to UXO incidents.

Given the significance of UXO last week in accounting for nearly half of all violent deaths, the 11 non-UXO deaths in Syria represented the 3rd lowest weekly count on record — after 9 from Feb 3-10, 2026 and 10 from Nov 4-11, 2025. It is this non-UXO metric that offers the most analytically significant measurement of directed, or kinetic violence in Syria and in so doing, Syria clearly remains on a path of gradual stabilization.

This past week, 81% of all violent deaths were caused by just two perpetrators: